On June 4th, pollsters, media, twitterati and everyone to offer any opinion (which is everyone in India) were buzzing calling it a big surprise and an upset. But, for those of us working within the Party over the last few years, the result wasn’t surprising at all.
The discontent had been building up long before - After effects of demonetisation, Modi’s re-election, catastrophic mishandling of COVID-19 and continued intolerance and apathy towards the common Indian. - All this was bottled up and was bubbling to the surface in various forums, discussions and protests - be it Shaheen Bagh or the farmers’ protest.
Our task was clear: break the iron grip that Modi and Shah had on every channel of information reaching Indians’ lives. How could we bring to light what people truly felt—their pain, needs, ambitions, and dreams—voices that had been drowned out by noise created through false narratives and distraction tactics?
This led to the conception of the ‘Bharat Jodo Yatra’ (BJY). While I won’t delve into its details here, it’s undeniable that the Yatra achieved its objective. It opened our eyes and provided clarity on the real issues. It also reaffirmed what we knew: the rot within the BJP had set in deep, affecting the common person across all walks of life—farmers, small business owners, laborers, engineers, government employees, soldiers, and even tech entrepreneurs. Across class and caste, hard-working Indians were simmering with rage at the injustice and were yearning for an alternative path that would restore their dignity and enable them to dream again.
The insights from BJY were distilled into ‘guarantees’ during the Karnataka elections, leading to a resounding success that surprised many outside the Party. We rejoiced, believing we had found a way to reconnect with the people. The Party and the populace were ready for change, ready to reclaim control of our lives and destiny.
But our celebration was short-lived. The subsequent state elections were a harsh reality check, sending us back to the drawing board. Telangana, which was crafted on the lines of Karnataka, saw a massive victory, but we underestimated the internal forces within our Party. We had to invigorate the Party cadre and push the leaders to take on BJP’s might head on. While BJY was a period of extrospection, it was now time for introspection.
Many outside the Party believe that Rahul Gandhi has the ultimate say in Congress, akin to how Modi and Shah command the BJP, or the Yadavs in SP and RJD, or the Gowdas in JDS. But the truth is far from it. The Congress operates quite democratically, led by a chorus of tall leaders from each state. Of course, the Gandhis have a significant influence, but it’s not authoritarian. The anti-incumbency in Madhya Pradesh and the numerous socialist policies enacted in Rajasthan, combined with the lessons from BJY and Karnataka elections, should have secured us easy victories if we had fought for the right causes.
After these elections, the same chorus of pollsters, Twitterati, and media once again began to scream dismissing Telangana and Karnataka as anomalies, claiming the Modi wave was stronger than ever. This euphoria, coupled with the upcoming Ram temple inauguration, whipped the BJP into a frenzy, birthing the idea of “400 par.”
All eyes were on the Lok Sabha elections—Rahul Gandhi’s moment to either shine or perish. With the national elections on the horizon, the Party unanimously rallied behind Rahul. On the other side the Modi-Shah brigade re-polished their usual playbooks of hate and distraction, now fortified with the Ram Mandir. The battle lines were drawn.
The task before us was mammoth. We had to combat the Modi machinery, which not only had unlimited access to funds but also the full arsenal of government agencies—CBI, ED, Income Tax, RBI, to name a few. Intimidation, coercion, and threats had been normalized and perfected during the decade-long reign of the BJP.
Rahul Gandhi was no stranger to this. His recent removal as an MP over trivial reasons and being evicted from his house was fresh in his memory.
Internally, while the Party pledged support to Rahul Gandhi, it didn’t guarantee that everyone would give their best. Believe it or not, state-level leaders often don’t fight national elections with the same enthusiasm and vigor as they do for their state elections.
The first step was the establishment of the National War Room (NWR), which would serve as the hub for all campaign-related activities. This was spearheaded by Sasikanth Senthil, an ex-IAS officer and a core member of civil society during the CAA/NRC movement, as well as a key player in the BJY. His leadership in the state War Rooms of Karnataka and Rajasthan had equipped him with the necessary experience to handle this complex and crucial role.
At the NWR, we knew how the country felt, but turning that sentiment into votes was a herculean task. We had to reorganize and reinvigorate the Party internally while crafting personalized narratives for the electorate, tailored to different demographics and regions. And all this had to be done with limited resources.
The Communications War Room was set up as a separate entity, focused on creating narratives, disseminating them across various platforms (print, digital, social media, and radio), crafting speeches, and countering the BJP IT cell’s false propaganda.
Our first task at the NWR was to establish war rooms in every state. The country was divided into five clusters (region-wise), with each cluster head accountable for the respective states. A Connect Center was also established at the heart of the NWR, liaising with all State War Rooms and other divisions—essentially serving as the hub for coordination.
We established separate divisions for legal matters, training, internal organizational communication, civil society coordination, data analytics, and a call center. An enviable team was assembled, comprising Party veterans (from IYC, NSUI, AIPC, AICC and others), along with fresh graduates, lawyers, IT professionals, full-timers, and weekend warriors—people with the right attitude who believed in the Congress ideology and were willing to dedicate their time.
This approach was uncharacteristic of Congress, which had traditionally relied on the charisma or merit of its leaders to win elections. But times had changed, and the Grand Old Party had to remould itself—and it did just that.
The next 100 days at the NWR were the most eventful in any of our lives. Each day felt like it couldn’t get more stressful or chaotic, but the next day would dawn with a new set of challenges—energizing booth/mandal-level workers, coordinating narratives and content, writing speeches, identifying star campaigners and key messages, prioritizing constituencies, working with state-level leaders and alliance partners, and crafting the ‘Manifesto’. A book could be written to chronicle those 100+ frenzied days.
While the NWR was galvanizing Party workers, the top leadership was executing alliance strategies and delivering the messages to the people with precision. A prime example was Uttar Pradesh, where the success was as much a result of Rahul and Priyanka Gandhi’s rallies as it was of Akhilesh Yadav’s engineering and charm.
Looking back to where I started, the election results weren’t a surprise to those of us deeply involved in the campaign. In fact, we were spot on in terms of the overall seat count for the INDIA coalition—doing slightly better than expected in UP and Maharashtra, and slightly worse in Bihar and Karnataka.
While Modi may have retained power, the real victory lies in our Party’s reinvention and the progress we’ve made in reconnecting with the people. The National War Room and our collective efforts have laid a solid foundation for the future. As we continue to hone our strategies and strengthen our connection with the populace, there is renewed hope that we can guide India back to a path of dignity and prosperity for all. The road ahead is challenging, but the momentum we’ve built gives us the confidence to believe that true change is within our grasp.